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ABSTRACT	  When	  a	  community	  has	  poor	  water	  quality,	  the	  U.S.	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  (EPA)	  requires	  it	  to	  comply	  with	  federal	  standards	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Act	  (CWA).	  The	  projects	  required	  to	  meet	  these	  standards	  can	  be	  very	  costly,	  so	  the	  EPA	  allows	  communities	  facing	  these	  regulations	  to	  evaluate	  their	  ability	  to	  afford	  them.	  If	  the	  EPA	  determines	  that	  ratepayers	  in	  the	  utility	  district	  would	  face	  an	  economic	  burden	  by	  meeting	  these	  standards,	  the	  community	  is	  allowed	  to	  extend	  the	  schedule	  for	  reaching	  compliance.	  This	  prolongs	  diminished	  environmental	  conditions	  beyond	  what	  is	  usually	  considered	  acceptable	  under	  the	  CWA.	  My	  research	  analyzes	  the	  benefits	  and	  costs	  when	  a	  community	  uses	  a	  schedule	  extension	  and	  I	  find	  that	  schedule	  extensions	  ultimately	  reduce	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  improved	  water	  quality	  through	  delay.	  I	  offer	  an	  alternative	  payment	  structure	  based	  on	  economic	  principles	  that	  capture	  the	  benefits	  lost	  by	  extension	  and	  are	  sensitive	  to	  cost	  burden	  by	  income	  group.	  
	   ES-­‐1	  
EXECUTIVE	  SUMMARY	  Hundreds	  of	  communities	  across	  the	  United	  States	  have	  poor	  water	  quality	  in	  their	  rivers	  and	  lakes.	  This	  is	  often	  due	  to	  having	  old	  infrastructure	  that	  conveys	  wastewater	  into	  water	  bodies	  during	  heavy	  storms.	  Communities	  with	  this	  issue	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency’s	  Clean	  Water	  Act,	  which	  requires	  that	  it	  reduce	  the	  incidences	  of	  overflows.	  The	  projects	  necessary	  to	  accomplish	  this	  are	  often	  very	  expensive,	  as	  they	  require	  years	  of	  engineering	  and	  construction.	  When	  affordability	  becomes	  a	  concern,	  the	  EPA	  allows	  the	  community	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  on	  ratepayers	  and,	  if	  costs	  cross	  a	  certain	  threshold,	  the	  schedule	  for	  meeting	  compliance	  may	  be	  extended	  in	  order	  to	  lessen	  the	  cost	  burden.	  The	  EPA’s	  method	  for	  assessing	  the	  affordability	  of	  ratepayers	  considers	  the	  cost	  per	  household	  of	  the	  projects	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  median	  household	  income.	  However,	  using	  the	  median	  household	  income	  may	  not	  give	  an	  accurate	  estimate	  of	  the	  community’s	  ability	  to	  afford	  the	  projects	  because	  income	  disparity	  is	  not	  considered	  and	  because	  the	  median	  is	  often	  overestimated	  in	  utility	  districts	  that	  do	  not	  lie	  within	  a	  single	  county.	  My	  research	  evaluates	  both	  of	  these	  considerations	  to	  determine	  how	  low-­‐income	  groups	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  affordability	  criterion.	  	  Several	  professionals	  in	  the	  wastewater	  regulation	  industry	  have	  criticized	  this	  method	  for	  assessing	  affordability	  and	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  rule	  supports	  their	  argument.	  When	  a	  community	  is	  allowed	  to	  extend	  its	  schedule	  for	  meeting	  Clean	  Water	  Act	  compliance,	  which	  can	  result	  in	  up	  to	  20	  additional	  years	  of	  poor	  water	  quality,	  environmental	  and	  public	  health	  concerns	  are	  overlooked.	  Using	  a	  benefit	  cost	  analysis	  of	  the	  Washington	  D.C.	  Water	  and	  Sewer	  Authority’s	  (WASA)	  plan	  for	  managing	  sewer	  system	  overflows	  as	  a	  case	  study,	  I	  have	  determined	  the	  loss	  of	  net	  benefits	  that	  the	  community	  would	  have	  experienced	  with	  its	  proposed	  scenarios	  for	  extending	  compliance.	  I	  have	  also	  found	  that	  the	  net	  benefit	  loss	  is	  greater	  for	  higher	  income	  levels	  because	  they	  tend	  to	  place	  a	  higher	  value	  on	  water	  quality.	  
	   ES-­‐2	  
Prior	  research	  has	  supported	  the	  notion	  that	  value	  of	  clean	  water	  increases	  with	  income.	  Using	  a	  study	  written	  by	  Carson	  and	  Mitchell	  titled	  “The	  Value	  of	  Clean	  Water:	  The	  Public’s	  Willingness	  to	  Pay	  for	  Boatable,	  Fishable,	  and	  Swimmable	  Quality	  Water,”	  I	  propose	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  net	  benefit	  loss	  resulting	  from	  an	  extended	  compliance	  schedule	  that	  significantly	  reduces	  financial	  hardship	  on	  the	  poorest	  members	  of	  the	  community.	  This	  involves	  completing	  projects	  in	  the	  recommended	  timeframe	  by	  charging	  sewer	  rates	  that	  more	  closely	  match	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  of	  each	  income	  level	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  net	  benefit	  for	  the	  community.	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INTRODUCTION	  Many	  communities	  across	  the	  United	  States	  do	  not	  meet	  U.S.	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  water	  quality	  standards	  promulgated	  to	  implement	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Act.	  This	  can	  have	  numerous	  consequences,	  such	  as	  exposing	  the	  public	  to	  E.	  coli	  and	  harming	  wildlife	  in	  lakes	  and	  rivers.	  These	  issues	  are	  common	  where	  combined	  sewer	  systems	  are	  prevalent,	  which	  occur	  in	  more	  than	  770	  cities	  nationwide,	  mostly	  in	  the	  Northeast	  and	  Great	  Lakes	  regions	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (Downing	  and	  Warsmith).	  Though	  the	  EPA	  has	  set	  guidelines	  for	  achieving	  clean	  water	  in	  these	  cases,	  remediation	  measures	  are	  often	  expensive	  and	  some	  communities	  encounter	  financial	  hardship	  when	  undertaking	  the	  projects	  required	  to	  meet	  regulations.	  When	  affordability	  is	  a	  concern,	  the	  EPA	  will	  allow	  the	  community	  to	  extend	  its	  schedule	  for	  reaching	  compliance,	  reducing	  the	  yearly	  burden	  on	  ratepayers.	  The	  framework	  that	  the	  EPA	  has	  set	  for	  assessing	  affordability	  is	  very	  limited	  and	  has	  been	  criticized	  by	  several	  organizations	  and	  professionals	  in	  the	  industry.	  My	  research	  uses	  case	  studies	  to	  evaluate	  this	  affordability	  assessment	  and	  the	  burden	  it	  causes	  for	  low-­‐income	  groups	  within	  the	  community.	  	   In	  addition,	  I	  use	  the	  Washington	  D.C	  Water	  and	  Sewer	  Authority’s	  2002	  CWA	  mandate	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  net	  benefit	  change	  resulting	  from	  a	  schedule	  extension.	  My	  results	  show	  that	  using	  a	  schedule	  extension	  would	  have	  caused	  a	  net	  benefit	  loss	  for	  the	  community.	  By	  also	  conducting	  a	  benefit	  cost	  analysis	  on	  individual	  household	  income	  levels,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  net	  benefit	  loss	  for	  the	  highest	  income	  groups,	  who	  typically	  have	  a	  higher	  value	  of	  water	  quality,	  is	  more	  than	  double	  the	  net	  benefit	  loss	  experienced	  by	  the	  lowest	  income	  groups.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  net	  benefit	  loss	  without	  imposing	  a	  financial	  burden	  on	  the	  poor,	  wealthier	  members	  of	  a	  community	  may	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  a	  higher	  utility	  rate.	  The	  final	  part	  of	  my	  research	  proposes	  an	  alternative	  cost	  structure	  where	  each	  income	  level	  is	  charged	  a	  rate	  that	  more	  closely	  matches	  its	  willingness	  to	  pay	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  if	  value	  loss	  can	  be	  minimized.	  
	   2	  
BACKGROUND	  The	  EPA	  issued	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Act	  in	  1972	  to	  present	  a	  standard	  for	  clean	  water,	  as	  well	  as	  federally	  mandated	  rules	  for	  addressing	  water	  that	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  standard.	  Many	  communities,	  like	  Washington	  D.C.,	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  aspect	  of	  the	  CWA	  that	  regulates	  combined	  sewer	  overflows	  (CSOs),	  which	  occur	  when	  stormwater	  floods	  the	  sewer	  system	  and	  overflows	  into	  bodies	  of	  water.	  Originally	  designed	  to	  keep	  odorous	  wastes	  out	  of	  backyards	  by	  conveying	  them	  through	  storm	  drains,	  combined	  sewer	  systems	  have	  been	  a	  part	  of	  the	  country’s	  infrastructure	  for	  centuries	  (Moffa).	  Figure	  1	  on	  the	  next	  page	  illustrates	  a	  combined	  sewer	  system	  that	  overflows	  into	  a	  local	  river	  during	  heavy	  wet	  weather	  events	  (The	  City	  of	  Portland	  Oregon).	  These	  overflows	  can	  limit	  recreational	  activity	  as	  well	  as	  harm	  wildlife	  and	  public	  health.	  The	  EPA	  requires	  that	  CSO-­‐prone	  communities	  take	  actions	  to	  limit	  their	  occurrences.	  A	  few	  common	  methods	  for	  reducing	  CSOs	  are	  to	  separate	  the	  stormwater	  and	  wastewater	  sewer	  systems,	  increase	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  combined	  sewer	  system,	  and	  build	  larger	  storage	  tanks	  that	  can	  manage	  excess	  capacity,	  all	  of	  which	  can	  be	  very	  expensive.	  
	  
Figure	  1	  –	  Combined	  Sewer	  System	  During	  Dry	  and	  Wet	  Weather	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  solution	  for	  communities	  that	  would	  face	  an	  undue	  financial	  burden	  by	  achieving	  CWA	  compliance,	  the	  EPA	  issued	  the	  Combined	  Sewer	  Overflows	  –	  
Dry	  Weather	   Wet	  Weather	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Guidance	  for	  Financial	  Capability	  and	  Schedule	  Development	  document.	  The	  guidance	  has	  two	  phases	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  burden	  on	  ratepayers	  is	  high.	  The	  first	  phase	  calculates	  the	  cost	  per	  household	  of	  the	  projects	  required	  to	  meet	  the	  EPA’s	  standard	  and	  divides	  this	  by	  the	  median	  household	  income	  (MHI)	  of	  the	  community.	  This	  calculation	  is	  called	  the	  residential	  indicator	  (RI).	  An	  RI	  of	  two	  percent	  or	  greater	  indicates	  a	  high	  financial	  impact	  (U.S.	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency).	  The	  second	  phase	  of	  the	  affordability	  assessment	  determines	  the	  municipality’s	  financial	  capability	  based	  on	  various	  debt	  and	  socioeconomic	  indicators.	  Table	  1	  shows	  the	  EPA’s	  financial	  capability	  matrix	  for	  determining	  a	  community’s	  overall	  burden,	  using	  the	  residential	  indicator	  and	  financial	  capability	  assessment	  (U.S.	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency).	  











Medium	  Burden	   High	  Burden	   High	  Burden	  
Mid-­‐Range	  
(Between	  1.5-­‐2.5)	  
Low	  Burden	   Medium	  Burden	   High	  Burden	  
Strong	  
(Above	  2.5)	  
Low	  Burden	   Low	  Burden	   Medium	  Burden	  
Table	  1	  –	  EPA	  Financial	  Capability	  Matrix	  	   Based	  on	  the	  level	  of	  burden	  determined	  by	  these	  two	  evaluations,	  the	  EPA	  may	  allow	  a	  compliance	  schedule	  extension	  up	  to	  20	  years	  after	  the	  recommended	  deadline.	  When	  a	  schedule	  extension	  is	  used,	  the	  intention	  is	  to	  complete	  the	  most	  important	  projects	  first	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  furthering	  negative	  effects.	  By	  delaying	  full	  completion	  of	  the	  projects,	  however,	  the	  full	  benefits	  to	  the	  community	  of	  being	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  CWA	  are	  delayed.	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LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
Criticisms	  of	  Affordability	  Criteria	  Most	  of	  the	  criticisms	  of	  the	  EPA’s	  financial	  capability	  measurements	  are	  targeted	  toward	  the	  residential	  indicator,	  either	  because	  of	  its	  limited	  scope	  or	  its	  uncertain	  foundations.	  The	  EPA’s	  Environmental	  Financial	  Advisory	  Board,	  a	  group	  that	  provides	  input	  on	  costs	  of	  environmental	  projects,	  states	  “[MHI]	  does	  not	  completely	  capture	  all	  important	  dimensions	  of	  financial	  capability	  and	  is	  frequently	  an	  oversimplification	  of	  ratepayer	  affordability”	  (Environmental	  Financial	  Advisory	  Board).	  The	  National	  Association	  of	  Clean	  Water	  Agencies	  presents	  a	  similar	  argument	  in	  the	  2005	  Financial	  
Capability	  and	  Affordability	  in	  Wet	  Weather	  Negotiations	  White	  Paper.	  The	  paper	  argues	  that	  MHI	  does	  not	  represent	  financial	  conditions	  across	  various	  sub-­‐groups	  of	  a	  community	  and	  that	  using	  this	  measurement	  may	  result	  in	  negative	  impacts	  on	  poor	  populations	  (National	  Association	  of	  Clean	  Water	  Agencies).	  Another	  issue	  with	  the	  EPA’s	  affordability	  rule	  is	  the	  uncertainty	  about	  where	  the	  residential	  indicator	  originated	  and	  why	  two	  percent	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  measure	  for	  a	  high	  financial	  burden.	  The	  EPA’s	  1997	  guidance	  for	  financial	  capability	  stated	  that	  the	  measures	  for	  financial	  impact	  “reflect	  EPA’s	  previous	  experience	  with	  water	  pollution	  control	  programs,”	  but	  did	  not	  provide	  any	  additional	  information	  (U.S.	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency).	  Other	  organizations	  have	  speculated	  what	  the	  EPA’s	  previous	  experience	  is	  in	  reference	  to.	  The	  National	  Association	  of	  Clean	  Water	  Agencies’	  assessment	  of	  the	  EPA’s	  criteria	  suggests	  that	  using	  MHI	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  affordability	  originated	  with	  the	  Farm	  Home	  Loan	  program,	  which	  is	  dated	  before	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Act	  (National	  Association	  of	  Clean	  Water	  Agencies).	  A	  United	  States	  Conference	  of	  Mayors	  testimony	  states	  that,	  “there	  is	  serious	  confusion	  about	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  [two	  percent]	  of	  MHI	  as	  a	  ‘standard’	  benchmark,”	  and	  suggests	  that	  it	  came	  about	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  EPA’s	  construction	  grants	  program	  and	  rural	  assistance	  in	  the	  early	  1970s	  (United	  States	  Conference	  of	  Mayors).	  Very	  little	  information	  is	  available	  regarding	  affordability	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  Farm	  Home	  Loan	  program,	  the	  construction	  grants	  program,	  or	  rural	  assistance	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  As	  the	  testimony	  suggests,	  even	  industry	  experts	  and	  members	  of	  the	  EPA	  are	  unsure	  of	  the	  exact	  reason	  why	  two	  percent	  was	  chosen	  as	  a	  benchmark	  or	  if	  it	  is	  still	  relevant	  today.	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Affordability	  Defined	  Defining	  affordability	  in	  the	  context	  of	  public	  utilities	  is	  necessary	  for	  evaluating	  benchmarks	  of	  affordability,	  such	  as	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Act’s	  RI	  threshold	  and	  benchmarks	  for	  other	  federal	  mandates.	  The	  National	  Drinking	  Water	  Advisory	  Council	  advised	  the	  EPA	  on	  its	  affordability	  criteria	  for	  the	  Safe	  Drinking	  Water	  Act,	  which	  has	  similar	  foundations	  as	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Act	  as	  well	  as	  a	  similar	  method	  for	  assessing	  affordability.	  The	  Work	  Group	  recommends	  that,	  for	  drinking	  water,	  affordability	  should	  be	  determined	  by	  evaluating	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  water	  quality	  (National	  Drinking	  Water	  Advisory	  Council).	  Carson	  and	  Mitchell’s	  study	  of	  the	  public’s	  value	  of	  water	  quality	  improvements	  determines	  that	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  water	  quality	  depends	  on	  several	  factors,	  an	  important	  one	  of	  which	  is	  income	  level	  (Carson	  and	  Mitchell).	  A	  journal	  article	  written	  by	  Raucher	  et	  al.	  defines	  affordability	  for	  water	  as	  household	  monthly	  water	  bills	  that	  do	  not	  result	  in	  an	  economic	  burden	  for	  low-­‐income	  households	  in	  the	  utility’s	  service	  area	  (Raucher	  et	  al.).	  The	  article	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  affordability	  does	  not	  have	  a	  quantitative	  measurement	  and	  requires	  a	  hands-­‐on	  evaluation	  rather	  than	  a	  subjective	  judgment,	  asking	  that	  the	  EPA	  use	  a	  more	  thorough	  approach	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  assessing	  community	  affordability.	  Neither	  willingness	  to	  pay	  nor	  a	  comprehensive	  evaluation	  of	  affordability	  are	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  EPA’s	  criteria	  at	  this	  time.	  	  
Alternative	  Affordability	  Assessments	  Several	  organizations	  have	  recommended	  alternatives	  to	  the	  EPA’s	  assessment	  of	  community	  affordability.	  A	  joint	  United	  States	  Conference	  of	  Mayors,	  American	  Water	  Works	  Association,	  and	  Water	  Environment	  Federation	  report	  proposes	  that	  affordability	  criteria	  consider	  income	  distribution,	  poverty	  rates,	  nondiscretionary	  spending,	  and	  other	  socioeconomic	  indicators	  in	  addition	  to	  income	  levels	  (United	  States	  Conference	  of	  Mayors,	  American	  Water	  Works	  Association,	  and	  Water	  Environment	  Federation).	  The	  report	  offers	  methods	  for	  collecting	  the	  necessary	  data,	  most	  of	  which	  is	  available	  online	  through	  the	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau.	  In	  2014,	  the	  Environmental	  Financial	  Advisory	  Board	  recommended	  that	  the	  EPA	  broaden	  their	  evaluation	  of	  community	  affordability	  beyond	  using	  only	  MHI	  to	  determine	  the	  residential	  indicator.	  They	  suggest	  considering	  cost	  of	  living	  for	  the	  area	  and	  including	  charges	  for	  other	  utilities	  in	  the	  burden	  analysis	  (Environmental	  Financial	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Advisory	  Board).	  The	  industry	  is	  beginning	  to	  realize	  that	  MHI	  alone	  is	  not	  the	  best	  indicator	  of	  community	  affordability	  and	  that	  using	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  approach	  is	  easier	  than	  ever	  before	  because	  of	  data	  available	  online.	  
CASE	  STUDIES	  	   My	  research	  uses	  three	  communities	  that	  have	  faced	  CWA	  mandates	  to	  evaluate	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  EPA’s	  affordability	  benchmark.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  describe	  the	  reason	  for	  each	  mandate	  as	  well	  as	  the	  cost	  and	  the	  approach	  used	  to	  solve	  the	  problem.	  
Washington	  D.C	  In	  2003,	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice	  (DOJ)	  and	  EPA	  reached	  a	  settlement	  with	  the	  Washington	  D.C.	  Water	  and	  Sewer	  Authority	  to	  reduce	  sewage	  overflows	  into	  local	  rivers.	  The	  overflows	  were	  a	  result	  of	  a	  combined	  sewage	  system,	  serving	  about	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  district	  (District	  of	  Columbia	  Water	  and	  Sewer	  Authority).	  The	  city	  tackled	  its	  CSO	  problem	  by	  creating	  the	  Clean	  Rivers	  Project	  to	  implement	  a	  Long	  Term	  Control	  Plan	  (LTCP).	  The	  total	  cost	  of	  the	  LTCP	  was	  projected	  to	  be	  $1.27	  Billion	  (District	  of	  Columbia	  Water	  and	  Sewer	  Authority).	  The	  initial	  compliance	  schedule	  was	  15	  years,	  however	  the	  district	  requested	  an	  extended	  schedule	  and/or	  federal	  assistance.	  Washington	  D.C.’s	  LTCP	  provides	  detailed	  information	  about	  each	  schedule	  extension	  proposal,	  so	  I	  have	  used	  this	  as	  my	  primary	  case	  study	  to	  determine	  the	  benefits	  and	  costs	  of	  delaying	  compliance.	  
Baltimore,	  MD	  In	  2002,	  the	  DOJ,	  the	  EPA,	  the	  State	  of	  Maryland,	  and	  the	  City	  of	  Baltimore	  reached	  a	  settlement	  addressing	  the	  city’s	  sanitary	  sewer	  overflows.	  Sanitary	  sewer	  overflows	  are	  different	  from	  combined	  sewer	  overflows	  because	  they	  are	  usually	  a	  result	  of	  poor	  infrastructure	  that	  causes	  leakages,	  resulting	  in	  unplanned	  sewage	  runoff.	  Because	  the	  city	  has	  also	  faced	  Safe	  Drinking	  Water	  Act	  mandates	  in	  addition	  to	  its	  $1	  Billion	  Clean	  Water	  Act	  mandates,	  they	  opted	  for	  an	  integrated	  planning	  approach,	  which	  allows	  the	  city	  to	  integrate	  projects	  for	  both	  regulations	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  prioritizing	  the	  most	  important	  aspects	  of	  each	  (U.S.	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency;	  Clean	  Water	  Baltimore).	  Using	  this	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approach	  may	  allow	  them	  to	  extend	  the	  compliance	  schedule	  for	  both	  mandates	  up	  to	  13	  years,	  which	  will	  result	  in	  more	  manageable	  yearly	  water	  and	  sewer	  rates.	  	  
Hartford,	  CT	  In	  2006,	  several	  organizations,	  including	  the	  DOJ,	  the	  EPA,	  and	  Hartford’s	  Metropolitan	  District	  reached	  a	  settlement	  to	  reduce	  the	  city’s	  combined	  sewer	  overflows	  and	  sanitary	  sewer	  overflows.	  The	  city	  created	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Project	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  its	  LTCP,	  with	  costs	  totaling	  $2.1	  Billion.	  The	  proposed	  schedule	  takes	  place	  over	  21	  years,	  ending	  in	  2026	  (The	  Metropolitan	  District).	  I	  use	  these	  communities	  to	  analyze	  how	  the	  EPA’s	  affordability	  benchmark	  impacts	  the	  poor.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  service	  areas	  for	  these	  utilities	  do	  not	  necessarily	  match	  the	  Census	  boundaries	  found	  in	  the	  data	  I	  used,	  so	  the	  numbers	  in	  the	  section	  below	  are	  representative	  of	  the	  utility	  district,	  but	  are	  not	  exact.	  	  
EPA’S	  AFFORDABILITY	  MEASUREMENT	  
Income	  Disparity	  One	  reason	  that	  median	  household	  income	  is	  a	  poor	  indicator	  of	  residential	  affordability	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  income	  disparity	  within	  a	  community.	  Using	  this	  measurement	  in	  a	  community	  with	  a	  high	  income	  disparity	  would	  cause	  low-­‐income	  groups	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  higher	  burden	  than	  in	  a	  community	  where	  the	  median	  household	  income	  is	  not	  much	  greater	  than	  lower	  income	  levels.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  United	  States	  were	  a	  utility	  district,	  the	  MHI	  in	  2014	  was	  $53,657.	  This	  means	  that	  EPA-­‐mandated	  projects	  costing	  $1,073	  per	  household,	  two	  percent	  of	  MHI,	  would	  be	  considered	  at	  the	  high	  burden	  threshold.	  For	  the	  country’s	  lowest	  income	  quintile	  of	  $21,909,	  this	  cost	  per	  household	  represents	  4.9	  percent	  of	  household	  income.	  As	  income	  disparity	  has	  increased	  nationwide,	  this	  burden	  has	  increased	  from	  4.8	  percent	  in	  2006.	  In	  communities	  like	  Washington	  D.C.,	  Baltimore,	  and	  Connecticut,	  however,	  greater	  income	  disparity	  means	  that	  the	  burden	  on	  low-­‐income	  groups,	  represented	  by	  the	  lowest	  income	  quintile,	  is	  significantly	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  trend	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2.	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The	  data	  used	  is	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau	  2006-­‐2014	  1-­‐year	  estimates	  for	  median	  household	  income,	  income	  quintiles,	  and	  population.	  
	  
Figure	  2	  -­‐	  Burden	  of	  Residential	  Indicator	  Benchmark	  on	  Low-­‐Income	  Groups	  	   If	  the	  EPA	  did	  consider	  income	  disparity	  when	  it	  decided	  to	  use	  MHI	  as	  the	  benchmark	  for	  community	  affordability,	  it	  did	  not	  account	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  differs	  significantly	  across	  communities	  and	  over	  time.	  In	  order	  to	  properly	  assess	  a	  community’s	  ability	  to	  afford	  projects	  required	  to	  reach	  CWA	  compliance,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  impact	  that	  using	  a	  benchmark	  has	  on	  low-­‐income	  groups.	  
EPA’s	  MHI	  Calculation	  Method	  Another	  challenge	  with	  the	  EPA’s	  RI	  assessment	  is	  the	  inaccuracy	  of	  calculating	  MHI	  when	  the	  utility	  district	  does	  not	  lie	  within	  a	  single	  county.	  The	  1997	  guidance,	  Combined	  
Sewer	  Overflows	  –	  Guidance	  for	  Financial	  Capability	  Assessment	  and	  Schedule	  Development	  suggests	  the	  use	  of	  a	  weighted	  MHI,	  calculated	  using	  the	  MHI	  and	  number	  of	  households	  in	  each	  Census	  tract	  within	  the	  district	  (U.S.	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency).	  This	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approach	  may	  overestimate	  actual	  MHI,	  which	  could	  cause	  EPA-­‐mandated	  projects	  to	  be	  considered	  affordable	  when	  they	  are	  not.	  Table	  2	  shows	  the	  actual	  MHI	  for	  Washington	  D.C.,	  Baltimore,	  and	  Hartford	  as	  well	  as	  the	  EPA’s	  would-­‐be	  estimate	  of	  MHI	  if	  only	  Census	  tract-­‐level	  data	  were	  available.	  Also	  shown	  is	  the	  percentage	  difference	  in	  cost	  that	  ratepayers	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  pay	  due	  to	  this	  calculation	  error	  and	  the	  percentage	  of	  median	  and	  low-­‐income	  levels	  that	  this	  represents.	  This	  data	  is	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau	  2014	  5-­‐year	  estimates	  for	  median	  household	  income	  and	  income	  quintiles.	  More	  detail	  of	  these	  calculations	  is	  shown	  in	  Appendix	  B	  of	  this	  report.	  
	   Actual	  MHI	   EPA’s	  Calculation	  of	  MHI	   Difference	  
Impact	  on	  Median	  
Income	  Level	  
Impact	  on	  Lowest	  
Income	  Quintile	  
Washington	  D.C.	   $69,235	   $78,493	   +13.4%	   0.3%	   0.8%	  
Baltimore,	  MD	   $41,819	   $46,237	   +10.6%	   0.2%	   0.6%	  
Hartford,	  CT	   $65,499	   $71,330	   +8.9%	   0.2%	   0.4%	  
Table	  2	  -­‐	  Median	  Household	  Income	  Calculation	  Error	  Because	  the	  RI	  calculation	  is	  considered	  high	  when	  cost	  per	  household	  is	  two	  percent	  of	  MHI,	  in	  Baltimore	  and	  Hartford,	  the	  cost	  would	  need	  to	  be	  ten	  percent	  higher	  to	  reach	  the	  same	  residential	  indicator	  threshold	  for	  a	  high	  burden	  because	  the	  community	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  wealthier	  than	  it	  actually	  is.	  In	  Washington	  D.C.,	  because	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  error	  on	  the	  median	  income	  level	  is	  0.3	  percent,	  the	  cost	  per	  household	  would	  need	  to	  be	  15	  percent	  higher	  to	  reach	  the	  same	  residential	  indicator	  threshold.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  actual	  median	  household	  income	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  calculate	  when	  only	  Census	  tract-­‐level	  data	  is	  available	  for	  a	  utility	  district,	  the	  EPA	  may	  not	  recognize	  a	  community	  as	  having	  affordability	  concerns	  due	  to	  miscalculation	  alone.	  In	  these	  communities,	  this	  error	  represents	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  income	  for	  low-­‐income	  groups,	  creating	  the	  potential	  for	  an	  even	  higher	  burden	  than	  these	  income	  levels	  would	  normally	  experience.	  
NET	  BENEFIT	  	   Using	  the	  Washington	  D.C.	  Water	  and	  Sewer	  Authority	  as	  a	  case	  study,	  I	  have	  calculated	  the	  net	  benefit	  to	  ratepayers	  of	  reaching	  compliance.	  The	  original	  LTCP	  required	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the	  city	  to	  complete	  the	  necessary	  projects	  in	  15	  years,	  but	  the	  authority	  requested	  a	  schedule	  extension	  to	  instead	  reach	  compliance	  in	  either	  20,	  30,	  or	  40	  years.	  Although	  the	  LTCP	  is	  now	  well	  under	  way,	  my	  analysis	  determines	  which	  scenario	  would	  have	  been	  best	  for	  the	  city	  back	  in	  2002	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  an	  economically	  desirable	  solution	  for	  communities	  that	  may	  face	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  future.	  
Methods	   	  Present	  value	  net	  benefit	  is	  measured	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  benefits	  less	  costs	  for	  each	  year	  under	  each	  schedule	  scenario,	  divided	  by	  the	  discount	  rate.	  
𝑁𝐵!" = 𝐵!"# − 𝐶!"#(1+ 𝑟)!!!!! 	  where	  𝐵!"#	  is	  the	  benefit	  in	  scenario	  i	  for	  income	  level	  j	  in	  year	  t,	  𝐶!"#	  is	  the	  cost	  in	  scenario	  i	  for	  income	  level	  j	  in	  year	  t,	  and	  r	  is	  a	  discount	  rate	  of	  two	  percent,	  as	  recommended	  by	  the	  Congressional	  Budget	  Office	  (Bellinger).	  To	  measure	  the	  net	  benefits	  for	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole,	  I	  used	  the	  average	  benefits	  and	  costs	  for	  the	  community.	  
Benefits	  	   Benefits	  are	  measured	  as	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  project	  that	  is	  complete	  multiplied	  by	  the	  WTP	  of	  water	  quality	  for	  the	  respective	  income	  level.	  While	  actual	  project	  completion	  rates	  are	  unknown,	  I	  assumed	  that	  about	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  the	  projects	  would	  be	  completed	  each	  year	  within	  any	  given	  scenario.	  The	  assumed	  relationship	  between	  schedule	  duration	  and	  project	  completion	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3.	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estimate	  is	  attributable	  to	  local	  water	  quality	  (Richardson,	  Loomis,	  and	  Weiler).	  Below	  is	  the	  valuation	  function	  for	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  water	  quality	  improvements	  estimated	  by	  the	  study.	  𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑊𝑇𝑃! = exp[0.413+ 0.819× log 𝑞! + 0.959× log 𝑌! + 0.207×𝑊! + 0.460× log 𝐴! ]	  where	  𝑞! 	  is	  the	  numeric	  value	  on	  the	  water	  quality	  ladder	  being	  valued,	  𝑌!	  is	  the	  household	  income	  level	  in	  thousands	  of	  dollars,	  𝑊! 	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	  household	  participated	  in	  boating,	  swimming,	  or	  fishing	  activities	  during	  the	  previous	  year,	  and	  𝐴! 	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  correspondent	  regarded	  a	  national	  goal	  of	  environmental	  protection.	  Because	  not	  all	  of	  these	  variables	  were	  identified	  for	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Washington	  D.C.	  community,	  I	  worked	  backward	  from	  the	  mean	  willingness	  to	  pay	  given	  in	  the	  study	  to	  determine	  a	  coefficient	  that	  would	  allow	  me	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  income	  effect	  alone.	  Below	  is	  the	  equation	  I	  used	  to	  determine	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  each	  Washington	  D.C.	  income	  level.	  𝑊𝑇𝑃! = exp[4.289+ 0.959× log 𝑌! ]	  where	  𝑊𝑇𝑃! 	  is	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  income	  level	  j	  and	  𝑌!	  is	  the	  household	  income	  level	  in	  thousands	  of	  dollars.1	  I	  expect	  that,	  by	  assuming	  the	  other	  variables	  used	  in	  the	  Carson	  and	  Mitchell	  study	  are	  constant	  across	  income	  levels,	  this	  may	  result	  in	  a	  negative	  bias.	  This	  is	  because	  higher	  income	  levels	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  participated	  in	  boating,	  fishing,	  or	  swimming	  activities	  in	  the	  previous	  year	  and	  they	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  regard	  environmental	  protection	  as	  a	  national	  goal	  than	  lower	  income	  groups.	  Not	  considering	  these	  correlations	  could	  have	  underestimated	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  of	  high-­‐income	  groups	  and	  overestimated	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  of	  low-­‐income	  groups.	  Ultimately,	  accounting	  for	  these	  factors	  would	  have	  increased	  the	  spread	  of	  net	  benefit	  loss	  between	  high-­‐	  and	  low-­‐income	  groups,	  but	  would	  not	  have	  had	  much	  of	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  spread	  of	  net	  benefit	  loss	  between	  schedule	  scenarios	  at	  the	  mean	  level	  of	  willingness	  to	  pay.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  most	  accurate	  measurement	  of	  WTP,	  I	  first	  deflated	  the	  2001	  income	  levels	  given	  in	  the	  Washington	  D.C.	  LTCP,	  then	  calculated	  WTP	  in	  1993	  dollars	  using	  the	  formula,	  and	  then	  re-­‐inflated	  back	  to	  2001	  dollars.	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that	  my	  estimate	  of	  willingness	  to	  pay	  is	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  revealing	  changes	  in	  net	  benefits	  between	  schedule	  scenarios	  and	  income	  levels	  rather	  than	  for	  pinpointing	  accurate	  valuation	  estimates.	  	  Income	  level	  data	  for	  the	  Washington	  D.C.	  Water	  and	  Sewer	  Authority	  came	  from	  the	  below	  chart,	  Figure	  4,	  in	  the	  2002	  Long	  Term	  Control	  Plan	  (District	  of	  Columbia	  Water	  and	  Sewer	  Authority).	  I	  estimated	  income	  deciles	  based	  on	  the	  chart,	  however	  the	  exact	  values	  are	  not	  available	  in	  the	  LTCP.	  To	  measure	  𝑊𝑇𝑃! 	  using	  Carson	  and	  Mitchell’s	  regression,	  I	  used	  the	  median	  income	  level	  within	  each	  income	  quintile	  to	  represent	  the	  respective	  quintile.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  lowest	  income	  quintile,	  which	  is	  the	  lowest	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  income	  distribution,	  I	  used	  the	  10	  percent	  income	  level	  to	  represent	  the	  entire	  quintile.	  For	  the	  second	  lowest	  income	  quintile,	  which	  is	  20	  percent	  to	  40	  percent	  of	  the	  income	  distribution,	  I	  used	  the	  30	  percent	  income	  level	  to	  represent	  the	  entire	  quintile,	  and	  so	  on	  for	  each	  of	  the	  other	  three	  quintiles.	  
	  
Figure	  4	  -­‐	  Washington	  D.C.	  WASA	  Income	  Distribution	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  Figure	  5,	  below,	  shows	  the	  WTP	  results	  for	  each	  Washington	  D.C.	  WASA	  income	  quintile	  as	  well	  as	  the	  mean	  willingness	  to	  pay	  of	  the	  community	  using	  the	  WTP	  results	  of	  each	  income	  quintile.	  These	  results	  are	  also	  summarized	  in	  Table	  3	  and	  Table	  4.
	  
Figure	  5	  -­‐	  WTP	  for	  Improved	  Water	  Quality	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  Quintile	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  -­‐	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  Income	  Quintile	   WTP	  -­‐	  Fourth	  Lowest	  Income	  Quintile	  WTP	  -­‐	  Highest	  Income	  Quintile	  





WTP	  for	  Improved	  
Water	  Quality	  
Lowest	   $10,000	   $215	  
Second	  Lowest	   $27,000	   $326	  
Third	  Lowest	   $40,000	   $384	  
Fourth	  Lowest	   $68,000	   $479	  
Highest	   $130,000	   $627	  
Table	  3	  -­‐	  WTP	  for	  Improved	  Water	  Quality	  by	  Income	  Level	  In	  order	  to	  calculate	  𝑊𝑇𝑃,	  I	  took	  the	  average	  𝑊𝑇𝑃	  for	  each	  Washington	  D.C.	  income	  quintile.	  By	  using	  intervals	  of	  income	  distribution	  rather	  than	  income	  levels	  for	  each	  household	  in	  the	  community,	  which	  was	  not	  available,	  this	  estimate	  is	  approximate.	  2	  The	  result	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  4.	  
Income	  Level	  at	  𝑾𝑻𝑷	   𝑾𝑻𝑷	  
$46,000	   $406	  
Table	  4	  -­‐	  𝑾𝑻𝑷	  for	  Water	  Quality	  Improvements	  The	  net	  benefit	  change	  resulting	  from	  a	  schedule	  extension	  is	  shown	  for	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  using	  𝑊𝑇𝑃	  as	  well	  as	  for	  each	  income	  quintile	  using	  𝑊𝑇𝑃! .	  Measuring	  the	  net	  benefit	  loss	  for	  each	  income	  quintile	  demonstrates	  how	  net	  benefit	  changes	  vary	  across	  income	  levels.	  Another	  important	  consideration	  is	  that	  the	  benefits	  calculated	  in	  my	  analysis	  are	  only	  for	  ratepayers	  in	  the	  Washington	  D.C.	  Water	  and	  Sewer	  District.	  By	  considering	  local	  benefits	  only	  rather	  than	  regional	  benefits,	  which	  would	  include	  those	  downstream	  from	  the	  district’s	  water	  bodies	  that	  will	  also	  experience	  a	  benefit	  from	  implementation	  of	  the	  Long	  Term	  Control	  Plan,	  the	  net	  benefit	  and	  net	  benefit	  loss	  are	  both	  underestimated.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I	  calculated	  mean	  willingness	  to	  pay	  as	  the	  average	  of	  WTPj=lowest	  income	  quintile,	  WTPj=second	  lowest	  income	  quintile,	  WTPj=third	  lowest	  income	  quintile,	  WTPj=fourth	  lowest	  income	  quintile,	  WTPj=highest	  income	  quintile.	  The	  median	  income	  level	  within	  the	  income	  quintile	  represents	  each	  income	  quintile.	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Costs	   Costs	  are	  measured	  by	  the	  yearly	  water	  rate	  in	  each	  scenario.	  Rate	  increases	  from	  the	  Washington	  D.C.	  Water	  and	  Sewer	  Authority’s	  Long	  Term	  Control	  Plan	  are	  shown	  in	  Appendix	  C	  of	  this	  report.	  The	  costs	  beyond	  year	  40	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  regular	  operations	  and	  maintenance	  costs,	  shown	  as	  the	  baseline	  scenario	  rates	  of	  the	  charts	  in	  Appendix	  C.	  
Net	  Benefit	  Change	  To	  calculate	  an	  individual	  ratepayer’s	  benefit	  loss	  of	  each	  scenario	  where	  the	  compliance	  schedule	  was	  extended	  beyond	  the	  recommended	  15-­‐year	  deadline,	  I	  subtracted	  the	  net	  benefit	  of	  the	  extended	  schedule	  scenario	  by	  the	  net	  benefit	  of	  the	  recommended	  schedule.	   𝑁𝐵!" − 𝑁𝐵!!!"!!"#$  !"#$%&'(,! 	  where	  𝑁𝐵!" 	  is	  the	  net	  benefit	  of	  the	  20-­‐,	  30-­‐,	  or	  40-­‐year	  scenario	  for	  an	  individual	  household	  within	  each	  income	  level.	  
Results	  	   Table	  5	  shows	  the	  total	  net	  benefit	  and	  net	  benefit	  change	  at	  𝑊𝑇𝑃	  for	  the	  15-­‐,	  20-­‐,	  30-­‐,	  and	  40-­‐year	  schedules.	  Using	  𝑊𝑇𝑃	  is	  important	  for	  benefit	  cost	  analysis	  because	  I	  am	  able	  to	  estimate	  the	  net	  benefit	  for	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  by	  multiplying	  the	  below	  values	  by	  the	  number	  of	  households	  in	  the	  utility	  district.	  The	  number	  of	  households	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  about	  $233,000	  because	  the	  population	  of	  the	  utility	  district	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  LTCP	  was	  600,000	  people	  and	  the	  Census	  estimates	  about	  2.58	  people	  per	  household	  (District	  of	  Columbia	  Water	  and	  Sewer	  Authority;	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau).	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Net	  Benefit	  𝑾𝑻𝑷 = $𝟒𝟎𝟔	   Individual	  Household	  Net	  Benefit	  Change	  from	  15-­‐Year	  Scenario	   Community	  Net	  Benefit	  Change	  from	  15-­‐Year	  Scenario	  
15-­‐Year	  Scenario	   	  $2,094	  	   	  	   	  
20-­‐Year	  Scenario	   	  $1,294	  	   	  $(800)	   	  $(186,004,052)	  
30-­‐Year	  Scenario	   	  $(148)	   	  $(2,241)	   	  $(521,232,899)	  
40-­‐Year	  Scenario	   	  $(1,416)	   	  $(3,509)	   	  $(816,146,867)	  
Table	  5	  –	  Net	  Benefit	  and	  Net	  Benefit	  Change	  at	  𝑾𝑻𝑷 = $𝟒𝟎𝟔	  The	  net	  benefit	  loss	  is	  highest	  for	  the	  greatest	  schedule	  extension.	  This	  is	  because	  all	  costs	  are	  paid	  eventually,	  however	  present	  value	  benefits	  are	  less	  when	  the	  schedule	  is	  extended	  because	  the	  value	  realized	  from	  water	  quality	  improvements	  are	  delayed.	  Having	  a	  net	  benefit	  loss	  in	  each	  schedule	  extension	  scenario	  is	  economically	  inefficient	  and	  this	  community	  should	  attempt	  to	  avoid	  leaving	  benefits	  on	  the	  table	  by	  reaching	  compliance	  in	  the	  recommended	  15-­‐year	  timeframe.	  Table	  6	  shows	  the	  net	  benefit	  and	  benefit	  change	  for	  each	  income	  level	  using	  𝑊𝑇𝑃! 	  under	  each	  schedule	  scenario.	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Benefit	   ∆	  
Net	  
Benefit	   ∆	  
Net	  
Benefit	   ∆	  
Net	  
Benefit	   ∆	  
Net	  
Benefit	   ∆	  
15-­‐Year	  
Scenario	   $(6,075)	   	   $(1,347)	   	   $1,135	   	   $5,201	   	   $11,553	   	  
20-­‐Year	  
Scenario	   $(6,502)	   $(427)	   $(1,990)	   $(643)	   $379	   $(756)	   $4,259	   $(941)	   $10,322	   $(800)	  
30-­‐Year	  
Scenario	   $(7,266)	   $(1,192)	   $(3,146)	   $(1,799)	   $(983)	   $(2,118)	   $2,560	   $(2,641)	   $8,097	   $(2,241)	  
40-­‐Year	  
Scenario	   $(7,937)	   $(1,862)	   $(4,162)	   $(2,816)	   $(2,181)	   $(3,316)	   $1,065	   $(4,136)	   $6,136	   $(3,509)	  
Table	  6	  -­‐	  Net	  Benefit	  and	  Net	  Benefit	  Change	  for	  Income	  Quintiles	  The	  net	  benefit	  loss	  is	  greatest	  for	  households	  in	  higher	  income	  groups.	  According	  to	  the	  results	  of	  Carson	  and	  Mitchell’s	  study,	  households	  in	  higher	  income	  levels	  place	  a	  higher	  value	  on	  improved	  water	  quality,	  so	  a	  schedule	  extension	  causing	  delayed	  water	  quality	  improvement	  results	  in	  a	  greater	  net	  benefit	  loss	  for	  those	  households	  than	  for	  households	  in	  low-­‐income	  groups.	  The	  analysis	  so	  far	  has	  been	  based	  on	  the	  Carson	  and	  Mitchell	  estimate	  for	  bringing	  all	  water	  bodies	  up	  to	  the	  swimmable	  standard.	  I	  now	  consider	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  value	  for	  this	  estimate	  that	  would	  result	  in	  zero	  net	  benefits.	  In	  a	  community	  where	  𝑊𝑇𝑃	  is	  $357,	  which	  is	  88%	  of	  the	  𝑊𝑇𝑃	  in	  Washington	  D.C.	  according	  to	  the	  results	  from	  Carson	  and	  Mitchell’s	  study,	  the	  net	  benefits	  under	  the	  15-­‐year	  scenario	  would	  be	  zero,	  indicating	  that	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  would	  be	  indifferent	  to	  completing	  the	  projects.	  Table	  7	  shows	  the	  net	  benefit	  loss	  for	  each	  schedule	  extension	  where	  𝑊𝑇𝑃	  is	  equal	  to	  $357.	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Net	  Benefit	  𝑾𝑻𝑷 = $𝟑𝟓𝟕	   Individual	  Household	  Net	  Benefit	  Change	  from	  15-­‐Year	  Scenario	   Community	  Net	  Benefit	  Change	  from	  15-­‐Year	  Scenario	  
15-­‐Year	  Scenario	   	  $0	  	   	  	   	  
20-­‐Year	  Scenario	   	  $(704)	   	  $(704)	   	  $(163,810,700)	  
30-­‐Year	  Scenario	   	  $(1,972)	   	  $(1,972)	   	  $(458,670,603)	  
40-­‐Year	  Scenario	   	  $(3,087)	   	  $(3,087)	   	  $(717,968,294)	  
Table	  7	  -­‐	  Net	  Benefit	  and	  Net	  Benefit	  Change	  at	  𝑾𝑻𝑷 = $𝟑𝟓𝟕	  Even	  when	  the	  benefits	  for	  meeting	  compliance	  are	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  passing	  or	  failing	  the	  benefit	  cost	  test,	  the	  loss	  of	  net	  benefits	  from	  delay	  are	  fairly	  consistent	  with	  that	  of	  a	  higher	  annual	  benefit	  estimate,	  such	  as	  what	  was	  experienced	  in	  Washington	  D.C.	  On	  average,	  the	  annual	  net	  benefit	  loss	  of	  delay	  is	  over	  $3,000	  under	  the	  40-­‐year	  completion	  deadline	  and	  about	  $2,000	  under	  the	  30-­‐year	  completion	  deadline.	  Aggregating	  these	  values	  up	  to	  the	  population	  suggests	  large	  economic	  losses	  exceeding	  $700	  Million	  for	  the	  greatest	  extension.	  The	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  most	  efficient	  solution	  would	  be	  to	  reach	  compliance	  as	  early	  as	  possible	  given	  communities	  are	  bound	  by	  the	  law	  to	  eventually	  comply.	  
ALTERNATIVE	  COST	  STRUCTURE	  In	  order	  to	  maximize	  total	  community	  benefits	  without	  causing	  a	  high	  burden	  on	  the	  community’s	  low-­‐income	  ratepayers,	  Washington	  D.C.	  could	  have	  developed	  a	  rate	  structure	  that	  more	  closely	  matched	  its	  community	  members’	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  water	  quality	  based	  on	  income.	  A	  paper	  written	  by	  Paul	  A.	  Samuelson	  titled	  “The	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Expenditure”	  suggests	  that,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  collective	  consumption	  goods,	  each	  member	  of	  the	  collective	  should	  pay	  his	  or	  her	  willingness	  to	  pay,	  in	  this	  case	  for	  improved	  water	  quality	  (Samuelson).	  Because	  some	  years	  require	  greater	  rate	  increases	  than	  others	  in	  order	  to	  fund	  specific	  projects,	  the	  yearly	  rate	  for	  each	  income	  level	  could	  not	  exactly	  match	  the	  yearly	  𝑊𝑇𝑃! .	  Instead,	  I	  have	  calculated	  the	  WTP	  for	  each	  income	  level	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  𝑊𝑇𝑃	  and	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WTP	  as	  %	  of	  𝑾𝑻𝑷 = $𝟒𝟎𝟔	  
Lowest	   $10,000	   53%	  
Second	  Lowest	   $27,000	   80%	  
Third	  Lowest	   $40,000	   94%	  
Fourth	  Lowest	   $68,000	   118%	  
Highest	   $130,000	   154%	  





Net	  Benefit	   Net	  Benefit	  without	  Rate	  Adjustment	  
Lowest	   $10,000	   $1,114	   $(6,075)	  
Second	  Lowest	   $27,000	   $1,695	   $(1,347)	  
Third	  Lowest	   $40,000	   $2,012	   $1,135	  
Fourth	  Lowest	   $68,000	   $2,458	   $5,201	  
Highest	   $130,000	   $3,258	   $11,553	  
Table	  9	  -­‐	  Net	  Benefit	  by	  Income	  Level	  Under	  WTP-­‐Adjusted	  Rate	  Structure	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   This	  rate	  structure	  allows	  each	  member	  of	  the	  community	  to	  realize	  a	  positive	  net	  benefit,	  unlike	  in	  the	  original	  structure	  where	  rates	  were	  the	  same	  across	  all	  income	  levels.	  Also,	  because	  the	  community	  would	  reach	  compliance	  in	  15	  years,	  there	  is	  no	  net	  benefit	  loss	  for	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  due	  to	  a	  schedule	  extension.	  
CONCLUSION	  The	  EPA	  attempts	  to	  protect	  communities	  from	  poor	  water	  quality	  through	  enforcement	  of	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Act.	  However,	  by	  allowing	  a	  compliance	  schedule	  extension	  for	  utility	  districts	  with	  affordability	  concerns,	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  CWA	  are	  undermined.	  The	  results	  of	  my	  research	  suggest	  that	  when	  a	  community	  such	  as	  Washington	  D.C.	  takes	  advantage	  of	  a	  schedule	  extension,	  ratepayers	  experience	  a	  net	  benefit	  loss.	  Prior	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  water	  quality	  improvements	  is	  related	  to	  income,	  so	  I	  have	  also	  shown	  that	  the	  net	  benefit	  loss	  is	  greatest	  for	  high-­‐income	  groups.	  In	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  more	  economically	  desirable	  outcome	  –	  one	  that	  does	  not	  result	  in	  a	  net	  benefit	  loss	  –	  higher	  income	  groups	  may	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  a	  utility	  rate	  that	  more	  closely	  matches	  their	  higher	  value	  of	  water	  quality	  improvements.	  This	  could	  allow	  the	  community	  to	  reach	  compliance	  within	  the	  recommended	  timeframe	  and	  may	  be	  possible	  through	  government	  subsidies	  or	  grant	  funding.	  For	  communities	  that	  face	  CWA	  regulations	  in	  the	  future,	  using	  this	  solution	  would	  allow	  for	  maximum	  environmental	  benefits	  without	  causing	  a	  burden	  on	  low-­‐income	  groups.	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APPENDIX	  A	  –	  U.S.	  CENSUS	  BURDEN	  ON	  POOR	  CALCULATION	  




Limits:	  -­‐	  Lowest	  
Quintile	  
2%	  of	  Median	  
Household	  
Income	  




2006	   $48,451	   $20,264	   $969	   4.8%	  
2007	   $50,740	   $21,204	   $1,015	   4.8%	  
2008	   $52,029	   $21,769	   $1,041	   4.8%	  
2009	   $50,221	   $20,826	   $1,004	   4.8%	  
2010	   $50,046	   $20,699	   $1,001	   4.8%	  
2011	   $50,502	   $20,585	   $1,010	   4.9%	  
2012	   $51,371	   $20,968	   $1,027	   4.9%	  
2013	   $52,250	   $21,433	   $1,045	   4.9%	  
2014	   $53,657	   $21,909	   $1,073	   4.9%	  
Table	  10	  -­‐	  United	  States	  Calculation	  of	  Burden	  on	  Low-­‐Income	  Groups	  Over	  Time	  




Limits:	  -­‐	  Lowest	  
Quintile	  
2%	  of	  Median	  
Household	  
Income	  




2006	   $51,847	   $17,546	   $1,037	   5.9%	  
2007	   $54,317	   $19,691	   $1,086	   5.5%	  
2008	   $57,936	   $20,159	   $1,159	   5.7%	  
2009	   $59,290	   $19,543	   $1,186	   6.1%	  
2010	   $60,903	   $20,216	   $1,218	   6.0%	  
2011	   $63,124	   $21,233	   $1,262	   5.9%	  
2012	   $66,583	   $21,782	   $1,332	   6.1%	  
2013	   $67,572	   $21,036	   $1,351	   6.4%	  
2014	   $71,648	   $21,230	   $1,433	   6.7%	  
Table	  11	  -­‐	  Washington	  D.C.	  Calculation	  of	  Burden	  on	  Low-­‐Income	  Groups	  Over	  Time	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Limits:	  -­‐	  Lowest	  
Quintile	  
2%	  of	  Median	  
Household	  
Income	  




2006	   $36,031	   $14,535	   $721	   5.0%	  
2007	   $36,949	   $14,655	   $739	   5.0%	  
2008	   $40,313	   $14,438	   $806	   5.6%	  
2009	   $38,772	   $14,017	   $775	   5.5%	  
2010	   $38,346	   $13,414	   $767	   5.7%	  
2011	   $38,721	   $12,856	   $774	   6.0%	  
2012	   $39,241	   $13,522	   $785	   5.8%	  
2013	   $42,266	   $13,588	   $845	   6.2%	  
2014	   $42,665	   $14,856	   $853	   5.7%	  
Table	  12	  -­‐	  Baltimore	  Calculation	  of	  Burden	  on	  Low-­‐Income	  Groups	  Over	  Time	  




Limits:	  -­‐	  Lowest	  
Quintile	  
2%	  of	  Median	  
Household	  
Income	  




2006	   $58,666	   $24,816	   $1,173	   4.7%	  
2007	   $61,096	   $24,537	   $1,222	   5.0%	  
2008	   $64,184	   $24,509	   $1,284	   5.2%	  
2009	   $62,030	   $25,031	   $1,241	   5.0%	  
2010	   $60,041	   $23,888	   $1,201	   5.0%	  
2011	   $60,965	   $23,492	   $1,219	   5.2%	  
2012	   $63,536	   $23,780	   $1,271	   5.3%	  
2013	   $63,603	   $24,167	   $1,272	   5.3%	  
2014	   $65,894	   $25,472	   $1,318	   5.2%	  
Table	  13	  -­‐	  Hartford	  Calculation	  of	  Burden	  on	  Low-­‐Income	  Groups	  Over	  Time
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Limits:	  -­‐	  Lowest	  
Quintile	  
No.	  of	  Households	  
Washington	  D.C.	   $69,235	   $78,493	   $22,132	   267,415	  
Baltimore,	  MD	   $41,819	   $46,237	   $14,358	   242,212	  













(%	  of	  Income)	  
Washington	  D.C.	   $1,385	   $1,570	   $185	   13.4%	   0.8%	  
Baltimore,	  MD	   $836	   $925	   $88	   10.6%	   0.6%	  
Hartford,	  CT	   $1,310	   $1,427	   $117	   8.9%	   0.5%	  
Table	  14	  -­‐	  EPA's	  Estimate	  of	  Median	  Household	  Income
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APPENDIX	  C	  –	  WASHINGTON	  D.C.	  WATER	  AND	  SEWER	  AUTHORITY	  LONG	  TERM	  CONTROL	  
PLAN	  ANNUAL	  RATE	  INCREASES	  
	  
Figure	  6	  -­‐	  WASA	  Long	  Term	  Control	  Plan	  Annual	  Rate	  Increases	  Required	  for	  15-­‐	  and	  
20-­‐Year	  Plans	  
	  
Figure	  7	  -­‐	  WASA	  Long	  Term	  Control	  Plan	  Annual	  Rate	  Increases	  Required	  for	  30-­‐	  and	  
40-­‐Year	  Plans
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